contains an extended defense of a thesis he calls "necessitism": it is necessary that everything exists necessarily. I will focus on just one of his many interesting and thoughtprovoking arguments: his attempt to show that necessitists are in a better position than their "contingentist" opponents to explain the evident utility and success of modeltheoretic semantics for modal first-order logic (MFOL). After a brief sketch of the necessitism dispute (section 1) and of Williamson's arguments (section 2), I will offer a contingentist interpretation of the model-theoretic framework (section 3) that I take to provide effective replies to Williamson's reasoning (section 4).
Necessitism and Contingentism
Modal logic in the sense that interests Williamson is a branch of modal metaphysics that studies the "sufficiently general truths" about metaphysical modality (92). To characterize the relevant standard of generality, Williamson introduces the notion of metaphysical universality (92) (93) . To understand this concept, note that the non-logical constants of the language of MFOL (with identity) have no fixed meanings-it hasn't been settled which properties are expressed by the predicates other than =, or which is true no matter which property we take F to express. A system of MFOL is correct iff its theorems are just the metaphysically universal formulas of the language of MFOL (95). Necessitism can be stated in the language of MFOL by the formula □x □y x = y. Since this is a closed sentence containing no non-logical constants, it is metaphysically universal (and consequently a theorem of the correct MFOL) iff it is true. Necessitism can therefore be viewed as a thesis about which MFOL is correct.
One point of contention between necessitists and contingentists is the validity of the schemata known as the "Barcan Formula" and "Converse Barcan Formula" respectively.
Their unnecessitated variants run as follows:
Contingentists will almost invariably reject both schemata. Contrary to BF, they might hold that there could have been something that was Wittgenstein's child even though there is (actually) nothing that could have been Wittgenstein's child. And contrary to CBF, they will likely say that something could have failed to exist but that there couldn't have been something that fails to exist. Necessitists will accept both schemata.
Model Theory
The vocabulary of the language of MFOL consists of a countable infinity of i-place is true in every model on that model structure.
A model is an abstract mathematical structure that needs to have no special connection to the modal realm-the worlds of a model and the individuals in their domains can be absolutely anything (apples and oranges, for example). To explain how model-theoretical reasoning can nevertheless establish metaphysical conclusions about modality, we need to give an account of the connection between model theory and the subject matter of modal discourse. On Williamson's approach, model theory connects object-language formulas to a range of structures (the model structures) that include the part of reality (the "intended model structure") that is the subject matter of modal discourse. (As Williamson notes (145, , this idea needs some qualification to accommodate the cardinality constraints arising from the set-theoretic nature of models.) In the intended model structure <W, R, w 0 , D>, W is "the set of genuine worlds," R the relation of "genuine relative possibility," and w 0 "the genuine actual world" (95). The intended model structure validates all and only the metaphysically universal formulas. MLM gives an account of which model structure is intended (139-47).
Williamson argues that contingentists cannot connect model theory to modal metaphysics by the same strategy, since on the definition of validity outlined above, 
A Contingentist Interpretation of Model Theory
My goal is to present a contingentist construal of model theory for MFOL that circumvents these difficulties. However, for expository reasons it will be best to start with the simpler case of model theory for non-modal first-order logic (FOL). For simplicity, I will drop quotation marks and corner quotes when referring to linguistic expressions, except when they're needed to avoid confusion.
We can think of an assignment of meanings to the non-logical constants of the language of FOL as a function that assigns a property to each predicate and an individual to each individual constant. 2 A sufficiently powerful metalanguage would allow us to formulate, for any given meaning assignment, a sentence that completely describes this assignment and that also provides information about all non-semantic matters that are relevant (given the meanings assigned) to the truth-values of object-language sentences.
I'll call such a sentence a "specification." With the help of a suitable semantic background theory we could, for every specification S and (closed) object-language sentence A, derive from S either that A is true or that A is not true. If these inferences could be formalized, then that would give us a precise criterion for metaphysical universality roughly along the following lines:
(2) An object-language formula A is metaphysically universal iff the ascription of truth to A's universal closure can be derived from every specification that provides correct information about all relevant non-semantic facts.
We would be able to use this criterion to establish results about metaphysical universality. I will argue that model theory is simply a developed and revised version of this approach.
To develop a suitable criterion of metaphysical universality, it will be best to use a metalanguage whose vocabulary includes all the logical constants (sentence connectives, quantifiers, identity predicate), individual variables, and parentheses of the object language. In addition, the metalanguage has infinitely many individual variables that aren't part of the object language and, for every natural number i, a countable infinity of ∧ C  will be taken to express a tautology. Moreover, I will use expressions of the form ∧ i  i to abbreviate the conjunction of all formulas  i where i is a natural number. ∨ will be used in the analogous ways, except that when there are no formulas of the form displayed by  for which condition C is satisfied, then ∨ C  will be taken to express a contradiction. I'll adopt the convention that formulas containing ∧ and ∨ are to be read so as to give these operators the smallest possible scope. For example, ∧ C  → P is to be
.) The metalanguage also needs to allow for strings of up to  quantifiers binding different variables (where  is a suitable infinite cardinal number). Where S is a set of no more than  variables, S (S) will abbreviate a string of existential (universal) quantifiers, one for each variable in S. (If S is the empty set, then a formula A that contains S  (S ) is logically equivalent to the formula obtainable from A by uniformly replacing S  (S ) with .) Furthermore, the metalanguage needs to have quote names for all non-logical constants and closed sentences of the object language, a truth predicate T, a dyadic first-order predicate R interpreted to mean "refers to," and a dyadic predicate E applicable to one individual and one predicate symbol and interpreted to mean "expresses." (For any object-language individual constant c k and metalanguage individual variable x k , R"c k "x k is to be read as:
"c k " refers to x k . And for any object-language predicate and any metalanguage predicate variable of the same adicity, E" " is to be read as: " " expresses .)
Finally, I will assume that the metalanguage has a monadic first-order existence predicate E! (definable in terms of  and = and therefore redundant, but convenient for our purposes).
In order to be able to describe every meaning assignment, we would need to enrich this "basic" metalanguage further to turn it into a language that is "universal," in the sense that it has a predicate for every property and an individual constant for every individual. We could then define a specification as a consistent metalanguage sentence of the following form:
S:
The 
To derive an assignment of truth-values to object-language sentences from a specification, we need a semantic background theory. A suitable theory must be based on an infinitary higher-order logic that allows open formulas to be theorems. The theory must also include the following non-logical axiom schema:
A is a (closed) object-language sentence. The X j i are the predicate variables of the metalanguage. Each x k is a metalanguage individual variable that isn't part of the object language. If j ≠ k, then the variables x j and x k are distinct (and of course the variables X j i X k i are distinct as well). x k is the set of all the variables x k , and X j i is the set of all the
is the metalanguage formula obtained from the objectlanguage sentence A by replacing each individual constant c k with x k and each predicate
, a specification S determines the truth-value of every objectlanguage sentence A, in the sense that either ⊦ S → T "A" or ⊦ S →~T "A" (where ⊦ symbolizes theoremhood in our semantic theory).
We can give a revised and more precise statement of our criterion for metaphysical universality, (2). Note that the non-semantic information provided by a specification is never wholly correct. For example, every specification entails that there are exactly  individuals for some cardinal number , whereas there are in fact more than set-many (and hence more than individuals. However, given the expressive limitations of the finitary first-order object language, this specific misinformation does not affect the distribution of truth-values over object-language sentences that is determined by S, provided S tells us that the number of individuals is infinite. Let's call a specification S "accurate" iff S represents the non-semantic facts correctly in all ways that matter to the truth-values that the object-language sentences have on the meaning assignment described by S. We can then amend (2) as follows:
(2*) An object-language formula A is metaphysically universal iff the ascription of truth to A's universal closure can be derived from every accurate specification.
If we modify this criterion for metaphysical universality slightly, then we don't need a universal metalanguage but can make do with the "basic" metalanguage I initially described. Note that a specification provides much more information than is needed to determine the truth-values of all object-language sentences. Call two specifications S and S* "permutation variants" iff, for some permutation  of the individual constants of the universal metalanguage and some adicity-preserving permutation * of its non-logical predicates, S* is obtainable from S by uniformly replacing every individual constant o with (o) and every non-logical predicate P with *(P). Permutation variants determine the same truth-values for all object-language sentences. Hence, for the purpose of determining which object-language formulas are metaphysically universal, there is no need to distinguish between specifications that are permutation variants. We can instead focus on what it is in common between their contents. This common element can be stated in the basic metalanguage by what I'll call the "Ramsey sentence" of the relevant specifications, which is of the following form:
where X i j and the X j i are subject to the same conditions as in the case of schema T FOL above, while D, the x k , the F j i , the c k , and the V ij are subject to the same conditions as in the case of schema S. The conjunct ∧ xD E!x is logically redundant but it will be technically convenient to include it in the Ramsey sentence. I will call a Ramsey sentence "accurate" iff it represents the non-semantic facts correctly in all ways that matter to the truth-values of object-language sentences. For every Ramsey sentence M and (closed) object-language sentence A, either ⊦ M → T "A" or ⊦ M →~T "A". Let's say that Ramsey sentence M "validates" an object-language formula A (M ⊪ A, for short) to express that 
by replacing the free occurrences of every object-language variable v with a(v). It is easy to see that the following holds:
Moreover, we can recursively specify conditions under which M, a ⊪ A is true. Let V be a function that maps every object-language individual constant c k to the metalanguage predicates express properties that are instantiated by the same objects. However, the shared content that is not captured by M is irrelevant to the distribution of truth-values over object-language sentences. variable x k , and each non-logical object-language predicate F j i to V ij . For any assignment a, let den a be a function that maps every object-language individual constant c k to x k and every object-language individual variable v to a(v). We can formulate the following recursive clauses (each of t 1 , t 2 , …, t i is either an individual constant or an individual variable of the object language, and F j i is any non-logical object-language predicate): "truth-at operator" < > that can combine with a World variable w and a formula P to form the formula w <P>, interpreted as "it is true at w that P" or "at w, P."
The semantic theory couched in the metalanguage will again be based on an infinitary  A) ).
The semantic theory will rely on an analysis of the modal operators in terms of truth at To obtain our semantic theory, we add the instances of the following non-logical axiom schema to the logical axioms (A is an object-language sentence):
x k , X i j , the x k , the X j i , the c k , and the F j i are subject to the same conditions as in the case of (T FOL ).
A Ramsey sentence for MFOL states information about Possible Worlds, in addition to the information about semantic and non-semantic matters that are also described by the Ramsey sentences for FOL. We can define a Ramsey sentence for MFOL as a consistent metalanguage sentence of the following form: (The proper-constituent relation is non-well-founded on the constituent formulas of an accurate Ramsey sentence M for MFOL: M contains a formula that contains another formula that contains another formula, and so on to infinity. In most formal languages formulahood is defined recursively in a way that precludes such non-well-foundedness, so our metalanguage would have to be somewhat unusual in that regard. To avoid this, one could reformulate the account below by replacing Ramsey sentences with "Ramsey sequences": infinite sequences of well-founded sentences, each more complex and logically stronger than the preceding one, that together say the same as a single non-well- Note that the following biconditionals hold:
for all a such that:
a(v)  D(w 0 ) for every variable v occurring free in A
Now suppose we introduce an additional way of using ⊪:
We can then state the upshot of (7) as follows: 
The following can be shown by induction on the complexity of A:
(10) If (9) is true, then the extensions of R, D, V, and a, together with (4 MFOL ), determine whether M, w, a ⊪ A holds.
We can simplify the account by two further moves. Firstly, we can remove the need to qualify (4 MFOL )(i)-(vi) with condition (9) by changing the definition of "M, w, a ⊪ A".
Instead of defining "M, w, a ⊪ A" as in (8), we use the recursive clauses (4 MFOL )(i)- (vi) as our definition, so that (4 MFOL )(i)-(vi) is true whether or not condition (9) is satisfied.
("M ⊪ A" remains defined as "⊦ M → T"A"".) (4 MFOL ) remains true, even after this change has been made. Therefore, given (10), we can conclude that whenever (9) 
(Note that (11) doesn't impose the condition that O w /= O w *-the existential quantifiers scoping over S w might bind different variables than those scoping over S w* . Accordingly, S w and S w* needn't be the same formula.) (11) reduces the range of sentences that count as Ramsey sentences. However, for every sentence M excluded by (11), some logically equivalent sentence (obtainable from M by relettering World variables in the right way) still counts as a Ramsey sentence by the new definition. Our modification in the definition of "Ramsey sentence" consequently makes no difference to which objectlanguage sentences enjoy the distinction of being validated by all accurate Ramsey sentences, and therefore doesn't affect our criterion for metaphysical universality. all accurate models is to be our criterion for metaphysical universality, since the metaphysical universality of a formula amounts to the actual truth of its universal closure on all meaning assignments.
On my account, a model doesn't determine the meanings of the non-logical constants.
In his discussion of Stalnaker's account (192), Williamson suggests that it is a significant weakness of an interpretation of model theory if it has that consequence. However, it's not clear to me that that is true. Model-theoretic semantics for modal logic isn't studying any specific meaning assignment but certain generalizations about all meaning assignments, namely truths of the form A is true on all meaning assignments. If two meaning assignments yield the same distribution of truth-values (given the relevant nonsemantic facts), then the ways in which they differ are irrelevant, in which case it can only be advantageous to abstract away from these differences. What would be the benefit of using models that represent inessential information? (Also, it seems clear that the models of FOL don't specify the meanings of all non-logical constants-the information they provide about the extensions of predicates don't determine which properties these predicates express. Why should matters be different for MFOL?)
Replies to Williamson's objections
Williamson's argument from (1) was intended to show that contingentists cannot connect model theory to the subject matter of modal discourse by appealing to an intended model structure. Since I have endorsed a different strategy for explaining the importance of model theory, my own account is not directly in the firing line of Williamson's argument.
Nevertheless, I am committed to the claim that some models (the accurate ones) validate just those formulas that are metaphysically universal by contingentist lights. Therefore, if
(1) were true, then that would refute my approach. However, as Williamson notes (136), the argument for (1) represented below as an example (an arrow from one world to another represents that the latter is accessible from the former).
The translation of M 1 into a conventional metalanguage is a sentence of the following form: In But there is no obvious need to do so. We often tolerate idealization, mere approximation, and other insignificant misrepresentation by models, maps and verbal descriptions, as long as the false information makes little or no difference for the purposes at hand. In any case, as mentioned above, necessitists trying to specify an intended model structure face similar complications arising from the cardinality constraints inherent in the model-theoretic apparatus.
In the most familiar sense of the term, you take an "instrumentalist" attitude to a theory if you regard it as a helpful device for predicting certain data but don't take it to be a correct description of facts that underlie and explain these data. The interpretation of model theory I sketched is not instrumentalist in this sense. It takes accurate models to represent certain facts about Possible Worlds that are distinct from, and explain, the facts about metaphysical universality that can be predicted by using model theory. It makes no difference to this point that the account regards accurate models as misrepresenting the facts in some irrelevant ways. What matters is that it explains the utility of the models as deriving entirely from their correct representation of certain features of reality that underlie the facts predicted.
